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CROSSROADS FOR LAW IN AFRICA
Paul 0. Proehl* and
Henry J. Richardson III**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This U.C.L.A. Law Review symposium, discussing selected
problems of law in Africa, arrives during a period in American history when both military and economic isolationism are being openly
considered in the sharp reaction to the abuses of the Vietnam war.
At the same time, probably more information is now reaching the
general American reader and viewer about Africa than ever before.
This growing American knowledge of Africa has been given a
sharper focus in the last few years as a result of the emergence
of a new pride among Afro-Americans who are more and more
openly claiming their African heritage, and forging new ties to
Africa's history, political dilemmas, economic problems, and current international role. What was more pejoratively known in the
American media as the "dark continent" is now proudly acknowledged as "black Africa." At last, some headway has been made
toward destroying the pervasive neo-Tarzanian myth that no "civilization" of consequence existed in Africa, and by implication no
notable social or legal systems, before the coming of the Europeans.
Beginning with Ghana in 1957, Macmillan's "winds of change"
ushered in an era in which nearly forty countries achieved independence based on majority rule in little more than a decade, a
process not yet completed because of the desperate intransigence of
South Africa, Portugal and white Rhodesia. Thus, forty new national legal systems have emerged, each dragging along its own
pluralistic baggage comprised of both the customary and the colonial legal past combined with a host of urgent nation-building and
development priorities. From this ferment some new concepts about
law in Africa have gradually appeared in response to the tumultuous events and sudden demands of independent nationhood. These
concepts will continue to emerge in the process of dealing with
problems of domestic development, intensified by internal impera* A.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, M.A. 1949, University of Illinois. Professor of Law,
University of California, Los Angeles; Member, Illinois Bar.
** A.B., Antioch College, 1963; LL.B., Yale University, 1966. LL.M. Fellow,
of
School of Law & Faculty Africanist in Law, African Studies Center, University
California, Los Angeles; Member, Indiana Bar. Mr. Richardson served as International Legal Advisor to the Government of Malawi, 1966-68.
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tives and enormous international pressures. These new concepts
must pilot the developing law of Africa through waters whose charts
inevitably borrow heavily from the customary and colonial legal
heritages, toward destinations that are both contemporary and
African. It is in the spirit of examining a variety of existing and
emerging norms of law, thus contributing to the increasing-but
still far from comprehensive-body of knowledge of what is loosely,
but conveniently, termed "African law," that the discussions of the
legal crossroads in this symposium are greatly welcomed.
The arrival of independence for each state in sub-Saharan
Africa had many significant symbolic meanings. The most important was the acquisition by Africans from Europeans of ultimate
legislative and executive sovereignty within their own territories.
This new legal situation was especially prized in certain countries
because of the previous repressive abuse of legal process by the
waning colonial powers in their last-ditch efforts to suppress African
efforts to achieve freedom, usually resulting in the proclamation of
"rebellions" and "emergencies," such as the "Mau
Mau Rebellion"
in Kenya of 1952-53 and the "Emergency" in Nyasaland (Malawi)
of 1959.
The formal receipt of legislative and executive authority by
each of these governments did not occur in a legal vacuum. Professor Seidman has identified three sets of claims, interests and
demands which struggle for recognition in an independent African
state: one set predicated upon customary law; another seeking
satisfaction under received law; and a third set making claims upon
the national government in the name of national development.'
Moreover, "Law"-by whatever definition and of whatever origin
-is called upon to respond to the ideology of the independence
or other ruling party,2 and to respond to the need for national unity,
to be done by integrating, with respect to the role of law, the various
heritages of customary law and resolving the tension between received and customary law. Further, "Law" was being called upon
not only to regulate the allocation of resources and the provision to
the people of certain desired goods and services,' but more significantly to confirm, and create conditions for the achievement of,
those domestic priorities decided by the government as necessary
1 Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-speaking
Sub-Saharan Africa, in AFRICA AND LAW, DEVELOPING LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICAN
COMMONWEALTH NATIONS 3, 20 (T. Hutchison ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Seidman].

2 Kuper & Kuper, Introduction, in AFRICAN LAW: ADOPTION
17-18 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Kuper & Kuper].
8 Seidman, supra note 1, at 22.
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for the long-range development and viability of the state. Some
priorities were dictated by the very need for survival: maintaining the constitutionality and the existence of the nation against
military and personal ambitions or divisive tribal influences; overcoming the obstacles created by the artificial, colonially contrived
borders and lines of communication of Africa; and surmounting
the linguistic and administrative barriers that reinforce political
frontiers.5 Other priorities were set as positive steps in future
growth: procuring a rapid increase in the gross national product
through capital investment; creating a social infrastructure including schools, medical facilities, and all the other desired features of
a welfare society; eliminating pockets of social injustice based on
racial, ethnic, sex or religious differences; and the speedy development of an experienced cadre of leaders at all levels, and a literate
population in general.'
As a result, a post-independence African phenomenon was the
felt need of the new governments to use law-as-legislation as the
obvious tool of social engineering to meet the pressing problems of
nationhood presented by independence and to reach development
goals, achievements symbolized by the revolution leading to independence.' The suddenness of independence dictated a resort to
imperium as a source of law, especially relative to problems of
economic development.' Not only did the state intervene by means
of legislation in the workings of the national economy, but in other
areas as well, at times by fiat, sometimes successfully, at other
times in failure. In many cases, although reform had had a bearing
on economic development, incursions were made into areas of personal law in which the price of disruption of long-established customary ways exacted a high political price. Such attempts were
made in the integration of laws of descent and marriage.' In the
same fashion, attempting to integrate different customary laws
based on different systems of descent, the state intervened in family
relations. The state attempted to adjust the status of individual
persons, either by refusing or consenting to legitimate foreign legal
provisions relating, for example, to marriage based on a different
4 See Allott, The Future of African Law, in AnucAN LAw: ADOPTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 216, 223-24 (1965).

5 Allott, The Unification of Laws in Africa, 16 Am. J. ComP. L. 51 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Allott].
6 Id. See P.-F. GoNmEc, LES DRorrs AFRIcAms: EVOLUTION ET SOURCES 141-45,
155 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GoNmEc].
7Allott, supra note 5, at 51; Seidman, supra note 1, at 19.

8 Kuper & Kuper, supra note 2, at 17.
9 See Roberts, The Malawi Law of Succession: Another Attempt at Reform, 12
J. An. L. 81, 88 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
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religious tradition. Moreover, the new government intervened into
the power and influence patterns on the local level by allocating,
or attempting to allocate, varying amounts of authority between
newly-formed government and party institutions and customary
sources of authority, thus juggling new doctrines of law regulating
local behavior with customary doctrines.' A primary concern
of
this symposium is the examination of some of these attempted
interventions and the difficulties involved in doing so by legislative
law.
The desire to accelerate the pace of development, the growth
of national pride and the symbolic fulfillment of national
independence were not the only factors producing this heavy reliance
on
statutory law. There has also been the inclination to use legislative
power because it is available and easiest to use, a circumstance
aided by the existence of a strong executive and a subordinate
legislature in many African countries. Also, the making of laws
is
one of the things that happens and is supposed to happen
in a
capital city. The territory was centrally governed under colonial
rule by legislation and executive decrees, usually from the city
that
is now the capital, and this heritage has lingered. The governmental
apparatus is there, and the administrative facilities are stronger
there than in rural areas. And there is a natural tendency to
compensate for the lack of administrative capacity in outlying regions
through the promulgation of still more laws.'
On the popular level, the passage of legislation fulfills a symbolic need. Notification in the government gazette, accompanying
ministerial and presidential speeches, and newspaper coverage
provide a short-run illusion of national progress which redounds
to the
credit of the government. This new legislation generally tends
to
be elitist in that it is usually preconceived in the capital and
may,
with significant variations, not represent the declared wishes of
the
majority of citizens, but that which the leaders of the country
thought was suitable for the people. The legislation tends to
be a
product of metropolitan thinking upon the data available,
which
is often inadequate, leading to a strong capital-city bias in
the
conception of what the legislation should accomplish. Policy-makers
10 Professor Ren6 David emphasized the importance of African
legislators and
administrators asking themselves on which human relationships
they
can act constructively through legislation and noted the common
assumption "that legislation
can be applied in the areas in which it is the will of the legislator
to intervene . .. ."
R. David, Critical Observations Regarding the Potentialities
and the Limitations of
Legislation in the Independent African States 2 (paper delivered
at the Conference on
Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems,
Ibadan, Nigeria, August 29,
1964) [hereinafter cited as David].
11 Allott, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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in the capital also tend to be more prepared to generalize regarding
in their
what may in fact be widely varying rural circumstances
those
than
more
drive for national uniformity in the name of unity
12 Often administrative cadres with priexercising rural authority.
weak.
mary responsibility for the success of the legislation are
peothe
of
There has been inadequate ascertainment of the wishes
both.
or
ple or inadequate harmonization of their conflicting wishes,
in
There has been too little effort made to, explain the legislation
myriad
English, or whatever the received language may3 be, or in the
in
produces,
This
nations.
African
most
tongues that abound in
legislation"-the
"phantom
phrase,
Professor Allot's memorable
have
passing of laws which do not have, and most probably cannot
4 "Such legislation is an expression not of power,
the desired effect.
5
noted
but of the impotence of power."' In these circumstances, as
and,
law,
is
it
because
by the Birminghams, law has little appeal
game,
a
of
rules
the
to
since it is "no longer usefully analogized
often in
becomes an instrument applied by a controlling minority,
traditional
a
transform
to
6
spite of significant internal recalcitrance,
European nationhood."'
society into an approximation of modern
As discussed in this symposium, the above is illustrated in
and
Ethiopia, with respect to effective land reform regulations
the attempt to unify the country by law around Amhara social
with
ideology by the creation of a special local court system
atto
respect
with
Ghana
in
limited jurisdiction. It is illustrated
in
And,
cities.
the
into
areas
rural
tempts to stem migration from
in
people
black
for
illustrated
a somewhat different sense, it is
system
judicial
a
in
counsel
to
South Africa relative to their access
sharply biased against them. Disrespect for law does not prevent
legislathose in a position to do so from mobilizing and invoking
cermaximize
to
tive measures on their own behalf where possible
cases
these
in
But
tain preferences, as in land litigation in Ethiopia.
was to
comprising primarily situations in which law-as-imperium
autarget
the
establish the basic preconditions for development,
legislation)
the
by
diences of the law (those intended to be regulated
though Asian-centered per12 Id. Gunnar Myrdal, writing from a world-wide

and rural population in
spective, believes that the dichotomy between government
about policies and
disputes
that
great
so
is
most, if not all, developing countries
an elite group who in turn
power within the government take place wholly within
the masses of the people.
are watched with resigned detachment or are ignored by
(1970) [hereinafter cited
49-77
PovERTY
WORLD
op
See G. MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE
as CHALLENGE].
13 See GONmEC, supra note

6, at 141-45.
14 Allott, supra note 5, at 52.
15 Id.
Overurbanizaton: the Gho16 Birmingham & Birmingham, Legal Remedies for
(1970).
261
252,
Rxv.
L.
U.C.L.A.
18
Experience,
naian
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were not sufficiently impressed by the sanctity or attracted by the
proffered incentives of the law to act in accordance with the
underlying predictions which had defined the objectives of the legislation.
Law-as-legislation in these contexts reveals governmental
decisions
lacking sufficient perceived authority and internalized consensus
on
the part of those on whom its implementation most depends.
To
a great extent, "Africa has become a continent of legalisms
rather
than legality.""
As Professor Seidman has noted, claims upon the national
government and claims by the government on the people, in
the name
of national development, are novel to our epoch and are
inseparable from social and political transformation.' It is becoming
increasingly apparent to African governments that despite
elaborate
legislative programs, much of the desired transformation is
not occurring. There is a growing awareness among governments
and
legal advisers that law-as-legislation has been a very blunt
tool for
social engineering, and that much of the legislation designed
to
establish preconditions for planning and development has
indeed
been "phantom legislation."'" As this awareness of a present
inability to effect social transformation in certain areas is confronted,
African governments find themselves approaching or already
standing at a crossroads-or more accurately, a fork in the road-posing
the problem of the uses which can and should be made
of future
legislation to establish the requisites for development and
progress.
Therefore "law in Africa," speaking quite generally, is at
a critical
decision point as to the nature of its future configuration.
The
choices are basically two: (1) Law primarily as the enactment
of
17 Seidman, supra note 1, at 27. An extreme example
of this phenomenon was
Nkrumah's Ghana. See Proehl, Book Review, 42 IND.
L.J. 277, 279, 285-86 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Proehl].
18 Seidman, supra note 1, at 22.
19 Probably in the forefront of this awareness
has been President Nyerere and
the Government of Tanzania. See Allott, supra note 5,
at 53 n.2. Another example is
the return by the new Malawi law of succession to a
reliance on customary law to
produce a workable system of estate disposition, the
government having rejected a
previous plan to revise the whole customary law of succession
applicable to Africans.
See Roberts, supra note 9. Much of this reappraisal
occurs in the form of government ministerial reconsideration of earlier legislation
passed in the flush of independence after reports from rural areas have indicated
its ineffectiveness. In this
connection law facilities and legal advisers in Africa
have become acutely aware of
the ineffectiveness of legislative and constitutional measures
in meeting their proclaimed objectives. See generally Obol-Ochola, Elopement
in Uganda, 3 E. AmR. L.J.
117, 139 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Obol-Ochola];
Parnall, Aliens and Real
Property in Liberia, 12 J. AFR. L. 64 (1968); Sawyerr,
Discriminatory Restrictions
on Private Dispositions of Land in Tanganyika: A
Second Look, 13 J. Am. L.
3, 27 (1969). For a theoretical Marxist approach identifying
the same general problem, see Eorsi, Some Problems of Making the Law, 3
E. APa. L.J. 272 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Eorsi].
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legislation; or (2) principal reliance on other forms of law-making
such as the development of new modes of locally-responsive law
through quasi-legal institutions such as local development and landloan banks, cooperatives with expanded powers of dispute-resolution, authoritative ethical statements by the party in power, the
drafting of easily understood explanatory statements to supplement
the statutes, active en banc interpretations by the judiciary of the
relationship between law and local responsibilities, and a deliberate
refusal to legislate by the central government in certain situations
in favor of the playing out of previously ascertained trends in local
behavior. These options will subsequently be discussed herein. The
degree to which law can be useful to the development of each
African nation in the future, and the degree to which truly national
legal systems will emerge with writs effectively running in rural
areas for questions of social transformation depends on the choice
and how it is implemented. The fact of the crossroads is revealed
by several factors: The inadequacy of commands from the state
legislative machinery in effecting social change; the divergence between problem-oriented legislative provisions and the actual perception of the problem among the people to be regulated; the
dilemma facing the central government posed by an increasing popular unwillingness to recognize the legal process as reflecting the
agreed goals of the society; and the question of what additional or
are now needed to accomplish the government's
reworked measures
20
social objectives.
in examin20 This is not to imply that African governments have been dormant
is far from the case. The point
ing the effectiveness of their own legal systems. This
of the utility of legislation to
here is that until recently the institutional problem
of equating law with
problem
philosophical
the
and
effect social transformation,
down to the local level
extending
process
a
as
legislation at the expense of its qualities
have not been met. Much
and involving a series of implementing decisions over time,
been to producing some kind of
of the governmental attention to law reform has
face of wide variations of race,
the
in
country
the
uniform legal system throughout
long-standing conflicting local
religion, customary and imported legal traditions,
development. The attempts
national
of
imperatives
the
and
rivalry,
tribal
practices,
of the law. The primary
unification
national
achieving
towards
been
have generally
task of integrating or
the
been
generally
has
goal
this
factor within the context of
legislative law and
subsequent
with
reconciling the customary law(s) of the country
recurring theme for all law
and
broad
a
forms
factor
This
precedents.
legal
colonial
multitude of problems, most of
in Africa. Within the context of this theme arise a
in any definitive manner but
governments
African
which are still unresolved by most
and without governall currently the subject of much ferment and debate within
customary law is to be
whether
of
question
basic
The
(1)
include:
They
ments.
whether a system of mixed
ultimately abolished in favor of legislative law, or
the most effective methods
(2)
retained;
be
to
is
customary-centralized legislative law
(3) the wisdom of reducof ascertaining the substantive content of customary law;
enactment on either
legislative
for
restatements
in
writing
to
law
customary
ing
conflicting custom
which
by
criteria
the
(4)
and
basis;
a temporary or permanent
For useful recent disis to be harmonized for the purposes of legal integration.
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m
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As has been implied, the general arrival of
African governments at the crossroads occurs in what has
been designated as the
"present post-colonial phase" of African legal
history." Different

governments arrive at this stage at different
times, according to
their particular circumstances;
a few have perhaps reached it, for
example Tanzania, and are actively engaged
in exploring the second
choice.
Realistically facing up to the fact that African
nations are at
such a crossroads will produce a new genre
of legal problems in
Africa." Assuming, as it is to be hoped, that the
second alternative
is to be chosen, there will be the task of establishing
new criteria
to appraise legislation hitherto unsuccessful
in producing the desired social transformation. The establishment
of such criteria may
lead to a second surge (the first being immediately
post-independence), of a hopefully more informed desire
to use law for social
engineering and, in this connection, to use
legislation as only one
of several available strategies in the legal
process to produce the
social and political transformation needed for
development.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES FOR ITS
ADAPTATION AND INTEGRATION

(Occasional Paper No.
7, African Studies Center, UCLA 1968); Allott,
supra note 4; Seidman, supra note 1;
Schiller, Introduction, in AFRICA AND LAW: DEVELOPING
COMMONWEALTH

LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICAN

NATIONS vii (T. Hutchison ed.
1968).
The crossroads in law discussed
here manifestly does not obviate the above
considerations, but presents the necessity for
governments to consider them in a
different light. It is further an historically
recent phenomenon than the general
problem of legal integration which was more
in the waning years of some
colonial regimes and, in any case, became of recognized
immediate concern to the new government
on the stroke of independence. The crossroads
which the questions above will relate in differentis an additional legal dilemma to
stances and policies. For instance, having decided ways according to local circumthat customary law shall be restated and incorporated into legislation, the
government then remains faced with
the problem of the effectiveness of that legislation-as-law
reapplied to the local
level of society.'
21 Allott, supra note 5,
at 53.
22 It should be noted that the
alternatives posed to an African government
by
this legal crossroads do not constitute totally
an either-or proposition. The choice
is basically between continuing the past over-reliance
on legislative and executive
commands from the capital to effect social
transformation, or, realizing the inadequacy of these methods, to rely less heavily
and more on programs of education and persuasionon legislative plans and principles
coupled with national and local
institution building, so that the total system
is more consonant with the surrounding
needs and attitudes in the population while
goals. For instance, Professor McAuslan has still functioning to meet government
noted that any remedies to be proposed
in land law must accept a large measure of
framework within which reform is to be made. public administrative control as the
See McAuslan, Control of Land and
Agricultural Development in Kenya and Tanzania,
in EAST AFRICAN LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 172, 180 (Contemporary
African Monograph Series, No. 6, G. Sawyerr
ed.,
1967) [hereinafter cited as EAST AFRICAN
AND SOCIAL CHANGE]. The question
is not whether to abandon legislative law LAW
altogether as a tool of social engineering,
but whether 'retaining the concept of law per
se as such a tool, the mix between
legislative and other strategies should be varied.
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In the South African context, the other side of the coin, the
situation is one of black people giving a last tired reappraisal by
attempting to invoke a legislative right to see whether a miniscule
amount of substantive and procedural justice can be wrung from
an apartheid system. These circumstances are the reverse of those
in countries to the north where governments and their legislation
are judged by wide popular expectations of justice. The general
fulfillment of such expectations is suggested here to be a necessary
condition for the use of law over time to stimulate social trans23
formation and therefore development. For if not so fulfilled, all
policies beyond the crossroads risk being passively or actively resisted by much of the population as adverse to or separated from
their vital concerns. The appraisal of legislation in both the South
African and independent African contexts must include criteria of
the perceived justice of that legislation by various sectors of the
people. Such criteria are required not only in gross contexts such
as apartheid-repression, but also in more subtle situations such as
beliefs among the people about the amount of corruption within
the central government. 4
This new genre of problems will differ from those demands on
the law already identified, such as national unity, legal integration
and consistency, and provision of welfare services. One difference
will be that the constituency to be immediately served by restoring
the effectiveness of law will in many cases be the government, because establishing the preconditions of development, for instance
the reversal of urban migration trends, often gives immediate benefits to no single group in the country but rather antagonizes or inconveniences many people. The realization of government objectives
will be the measure of legislative success in achieving these preconditions, as opposed to the meeting of popular demands and the
amelioration of local grievances. In that sense, this new genre of
problems will be largely those of public regulation for the purposes
of state planning. The legal and administrative roots of much of
the present ineffectiveness of African governments in this area de23 The problem of the role of law relative to the justice of the effective allocation of resources, especially economic resources, is by no means confined to the
developing countries and South Africa. It is intensely present in both the United
States and the international community, and presents a crisis for law in both arenas.
See Richardson, Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to the Needs
of Black Southern Africa, UFAHAMU, Spring 1970, at 22, 27-28 (African Studies
Center, UCLA, 1970).
on develop24 Gunnar Myrdal has incisively discussed the effect of corruption
ment, the distorted attitudes towards it by Western academics, and the necessity of
its elimination to successfully use law as a tool of social engineering. See CmALLENGE,
supra note 12, at 227-42; Myrdal, The "Soft State" in Underdeveloped Countries, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1118 (1968).
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rive from attempts to solve this category of African problems by
applying principles of received European law. In English-speaking
Africa there were few norms of public law received from England
prior to independence, and few have since evolved relevant to
planning functions; particularly missing are procedural statutes detailing planning functions. The ineffective implementation of plans
is augmented by the failure of African governments to assimilate
planning concepts to the ministerial system of government and
public service.2 5 Centralized regulation and planning enhances the
already strong trends towards elitism in African governments. The
monopoly of knowledge of the requirements of national development is held by expatriates and a handful of indigenous leaders,
and those goals and objectives are usually as much imposed by the
government as agreed upon between key sectors of the population
and the government. In the absence of qualitative increases in
literacy, the danger of such over-concentration will remain. 26 Missing in the future, however, will be the former empty assurance of
law-as-imperium, hopefully to be replaced by a new awareness of
the dangers of metropolitan elitism. Law will then hopefully be
seen by those holding effective power as a process of decision-making that includes the lowest district officials and that rests on the
perceptions and expectations of the target population as to the
authority of those making the decisions. The continuing task will
then be to adjust the necessities of public regulation for national
purposes to the maintenance of the authority of the legislators and
administrators, in the context of the expectations (hopefully informed) of the populace relative to both, by means which must in
the long run be both extra-legislative and peacefully persuasive. In
turn, that authority will scarcely be maintained without an awareness on the part of decision-makers at each stage of the sources
and functions of law in simultaneously creating conditions for
minimum public order and desired social change, of the values held
by the people which sustain or alter it, and of its creative role in
moving a society towards generally-approved goals by specific and
graduated formulations.2 7
25 See Seidman, supra note 1, at 36. An additional problem is presented by
the

irrelevancy of the cornerstones of English contract law to contracts between gov-

ernment agencies, an integral part of the planning process. Some substitute system
of administration between public enterprises controlled by altogether different norms
is needed, such as has evolved in Senegal. The same general question of the adequacy of received contract norms arises in contractual relationships between public
and private enterprises, where foreign private enterprises can often mobilize more
bargaining leverage than can domestic public ones. Id. at 43-44.
26 See Proehl, supra note 17, at 288.
27 Id. at 291. See also M. McDouoAL & AssocIATzs, STUDIs IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1960).
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The essays in this symposium well illustrate different pathways
to the same crossroads, and portray situations for which solutions
must be found: (1) The ineffectiveness of public law regulation to
meet a national problem of overurbanization; (2) unsuccessful attempts, or even chronic inability, to diminish the influence of an
aristocracy with vested interests in the status quo, in order to effectively institute land reform as a precondition of development; (3)
an unsuccessful attempt by a ruling ethnic group to impose a dominant and potentially unifying ideology on other ethnic peoples
through the establishment of local judicial institutions to transform
local customary law; (4) an unsuccessful attempt by some whites,
and implicitly all blacks in South Africa, to maintain the commonlaw principle of right to counsel with its underlying implication
of equality before the law, in a political, economic, social, and therefore legal, context of inequality.

II. THE CROSSROADS IN CONTEXT
In their study of overurbanization in Ghana, the Birminghams
point out that the concentration of the proletariat in urban areas
(although economically productive in the short run) augments its
power to threaten (in certain contexts) underlying development
programs.2" There are harsher methods available, of course, but one
function of law is to provide persuasive methods of regulating
the flow of primarily young men into the cities. The government
has tried four responses to the problem: (1) Regulation of urban
income, both in the government's capacity as the major urban employer and as holder of legislative authority to determine the national minimum wage, the savings from both measures to be used for
rural development; (2) dispersion of industry by means of various
incentives to rural areas, although there are demonstrable economic
advantages in urban industrial concentration during the early stages
of growth, but at political cost; (3) rural development financed
additionally by savings from underpaying cocoa farmers for their
crops, with the possibility of this measure having a countereffect,
and accelerating the migration into the cities; and (4) discrimination against the Lebano-Syrian community by specifically-directed
regulations to restrict their participation in business and employment, coupled with massive arrests and repatriation of aliens generally, including Africans, both of which gained urban popularity
for the government.29
28 Birmingham & Birmingham, Legal Remedies for Overurbanization:
Ghanaian Experience, 18 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 252, 261 (1970).
29 Id. at 261-69.

The
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In drawing lessons from the experience of these basically unsuccessful government legal and quasi-legal measures, the Birminghams note that some of these difficulties can be traced to the
decline
in world cocoa prices.8 o In observing Ghana's approach to
this
crossroads of law, its experience would seem to serve as a portent
of future difficulties for other African states, especially for
those
already showing signs of sustained urban migration, such
as Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. In moving away
from
over-reliance on legislative regulation and general legal commands
from the capital, it would seem necessary for the government
to
realize the truth of the authors' observations that (1) all claims
on
the country's resources cannot be simultaneously satisfied, yet
none
can be ignored; and (2) the ongoing process of urbanization
is at
the root of many developmental difficulties, and any solution
at the
expense of the already overburdened urban population will
only
contribute to the general instability.8 This dilemma would
seem
to call for an intensive process of popular education by the
government on the nature of the crisis facing the country, especially
as it threatens both urban and rural development, coupled
with
surveys of national attitudes by the most accurate means as
a prelude to new legislative measures and the establishment
of new
institutions.
If the task of the law in these circumstances is to provide
measures for peacefully regulating the flow of young men into
the
cities, a consensus among a significant portion of these men
as to
what inducements would indeed motivate them to remain in
rural
areas must be established as a foundation for any further
legal
regulation, if such regulation is to escape the list of "phantom
legislation." The Birminghams also note that legal institutions
inherited from the colonial past apparently have a declining
moral
force, a factor in the decline of the respect given to law as
law.82
This suggests that the second alternative may have a strong
symbolic dimension. A reformation of certain legal institutions
connected with the dilemmas leading to the crossroads to exorcise
the
colonial past by instituting procedures, personnel and legal
doctrines that will be perceived as more independently African,
might
well have to be linked with the aforementioned process of popular
education and consensus-building. Such a possibility seems
more
strongly indicated by the fact that the young men now crowding
into urban areas are noted as constituting one of the most politically
aware elements of the population. If strong feelings of anti-Euro80 Id. at 269.
81 Id. at 269-70.
82 Id. at 261.
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peanism, Pan-Africanism, or other deeply felt attitudes are present, these must be taken into account in building a consensus for
the new forms of legal regulation that are required.
Although Professor Singer's discussion of the Atbia Dagnia
of Ethiopia 3 relates to an entirely different factual context, a similar dilemma for the future effectiveness of law and legal institutions
is presented. The establishment of the Atbia Dagnia (literally, local
judge), deriving from its history as an Amhara institution, was an
attempt to integrate customary law into the national legal system.
It was part of an overall development scheme ultimately aimed at
creating a unified society in which all persons assumed or submitted
to Amhara social ideology, that of the Emperor. Professor Singer's
empirical exploration of the Atbia Dagnia as one aspect of that
program of legal integration is also a study of the effectiveness of
an attempt at national institutionalization of Amhara legal ideology.
The procedures for appointing the Atbia Dagnia were seemingly unsystematic and the post never generated much enthusiasm among
potential appointees. The administrative line of authority up through
the Ministry of Justice was unclear. More significantly, the legal
status of the Atbia Dagnia was inconsistently defined by the government, especially as to the scope of its jurisdiction, and its functions as an on-going institution were scarcely, if at all, taken into
account in drafting the Procedural Code. This latter produced conflicts of jurisdiction with other legal institutions and wide uncertainties of interpretation. Of the potential number of cases which
decould have been brought before it, the Atbia Dagnia heard a
institutions.
legal
available
other
with
cided minority in comparison
Of those cases actually before it, Atbia Dagnias gave decisions
resolving only a minority. These findings rightly lead Professor
Singer to state that there was actually relatively little assumption
of legal authority by the Atbia Dagnia.1
The discussion concludes that the establishment of the Atbia
Dagnia was a positive and thought-provoking attempt at legal integration. But it is a failure in terms of its actual functioning because it was an attempt to institutionalize legal values without first
investigating the readiness of various segments of Ethiopian society
to accept the corresponding shifts in local power structures." Professor Singer ends by suggesting that an effective allocation of
power and provision of new authority by the central government is
Legal Setting: The
83 Singer, A Traditional Legal Institution in a Modern
Atbia Dagnia of Ethiopia, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 308 (1970).
84 Id. at 332.
85 Id. at 333.
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needed to make the Atbia Dagnia work. 6 In terms of the crossroads, it seems clear that for this institution to perform its proclaimed purpose, further allocations of power and authority must
rest upon accurate knowledge of the attitudes of the local people
directly affected who can determine the success or failure of the
Atbia Dagnia by withholding their disputes or actively utilizing it
as a dispute-resolving agency. On the basis of such a survey of
attitudes, some program of local communication and education by
the central government would seem necessary to resolve, where
possible, conflicts between ascertained local attitudes and the purposes of the Atbia Dagnia and, where impossible, to re-evaluate the
latter for alternative approaches-to ask whether the Atbia Dagnia
is worth the inevitable conflicts and attempted circumvention of its
jurisdiction. Also, crucial as a first task, of course, is the resolution
of internal inconsistencies within existing legislation as to the exact
role and jurisdiction of the Atbia Dagnia.
Although Ethiopia's history varies from that of most of subSaharan Africa in that it has never been colonized by an outside
power, the position of the Amhara in emerging as internal conquerors of the national territory make this experience in ineffective
legal integration highly relevant to states where independence-generated national unity is now being endangered by progressively
emerging group conflicts and rivalries. The Kikuyu-Luo, LoziBemba, Lango-Buganda conflicts in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda
are significant examples, where dominant tribes generally controlling the government are responsible for developing the country and
maintaining national unity. The tool of legal integration by legislation would seem to be a useful one, but available only where an
adequate local consensus has first been established. Its ineffectiveness in such situations heralds not only the approach of this
crossroads for national law but perhaps also a deeper crisis of development and the maintenance of national public order as a precursor of that development.
Mr. Ream's discussion of the existence of a right to counsel
in South African law3 7 presents South Africa as approaching this
legal crossroads from an opposite direction than do the black-ruled
states to the north. For the latter, the dilemma is, in the context of
independence-derived development objectives, between a continuing
over-use of the legislative power, which is now confronting the law
of diminishing returns on significant policies, and the establishment
86 Id. at 334.

8T Ream, The Right to Counsel in South Africa, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
335

(1970) [hereinafter cited as Ream].
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a proclaimed march towards national development in fulfillment of
mass aspirations, whereas in South Africa it is produced by admitted attempts to retain economic benefits and power for a restricted
group within a legal structure supported by racist repression.
Mr. Ream's essay considers the effectiveness of a legislativelygranted (there is no written South African constitution) right to
counsel and notes at the beginning that the two main constraints
inhibiting the exercise of this right by black South Africans are
lack of finances to retain counsel and the general limitations of the
ruling apartheid ideology.8 9 By way of useful comparison with the
effectiveness of the analogous right in the law of the United States,
the right is found to be less than absolute, effectively attaching only
when the defendant is in jail. The real question, aptly stated, is
the existence of the right in the face of legislation which is patently
political, such as the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism
Acts.4 The courts have retained a degree of effectiveness in protecting the right by generally holding that the defendant must have
counsel at trial if he requests it, can pay for it and counsel is ready
and willing, and that he have counsel in capital cases without exception, to be provided by the state if necessary. There has been
some slight judicial expansion of availability of counsel for detainees and witnesses, leading to the as yet untested implication
that the courts might be willing to soften somewhat the provisions
of internal security legislation. Legal aid programs, moreover, are
currently government-dominated. The last such major independent
program, the Defence and Aid Fund set up to defend those charged
with political crimes, was disbanded in 1966 under heavy government attack. 1 Mr. Ream concludes that this limited right is ineffectively protected and that most prosecutions are probably conducted
without counsel available to the defendant.4
The South African situation presents law in Africa and elsewhere with what is ultimately its most profound question: Can law
be relevant in accomplishing revolutionary social change, or must
there come a point when those participating in the legal process
have to realize that their skills and systematic approach are irrelevant until some future time when more cataclysmic political
and military forces have established a new public order that calls
for regulation and institutionalization?
89 Ream, supra note 37, at 335-37.
40 Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, 6 REp. S. Ani. STATS. 781 (1965); Suppression
of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, 6 REP. S. AFR. STATS. 71 (1965).
41 Ream, supra note 37, at 352-53.
42 Id. 353-55, 357-58.
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cise on land reform policy than the first; specific goals and detailed
suggestions were proposed.50 Currently none of the goals
have been
achieved, but action has been taken on the recommendations
on
administration, principally the creation of a Ministry of Land
Reform and Administration. Also some tax reform legislation
was
enacted; though of uncertain practical importance, the legislation
did simplify some systems of land tenure and taxation. The
elimination of the tax-in-lieu-of-tithe, a practice highly favorable
to landlords, was potentially significant for land reform and was
in fact a
measure of tenancy reform. But with this one exception,
land and
income taxation in Ethiopia have not been particularly reformist
in
character. 5'
Professor Dunning notes that rights over land play an
important part in maintaining the current political system,
including
the distribution of land grants to the political faithful, a
practice
the new Ministry, for political reasons, has been unable
to control. 2 Most of such grants have gone to non-farming
military
officers, civil servants and provincial and district governors,
in spite
of the official policy that every53 landless Ethiopian who
wishes to
farm will receive half a gasha of land. The favored grantees
then
lease the granted land to impoverished cultivators. The
former
oppose any change in the status quo. It is no surprise that
government land and tax policies have often been the focal point
of armed
rebellions by peasants. The balabat's local authority has
been also
somewhat undermined by the central government; land
reform
would further do so. The heavy representation of balabats
in Parliament leads to the expectation that Parliament itself will
impede
land reform. The sovereignty of the Church over vast church
lands
is another on the list of substantial political obstacles
to land
reform.
The Third Five Year Plan of 1968-73 primarily restates
the
unachieved land reform objectives of the Second. The
need
for
"vigorous policies of land reform" is regarded
as evident if progress
in agrarian reconstruction and development is to be made,
and various measures are suggested.54 "Disheartening results" were
candidly admitted and attributed to "lack of policies" and "inadequate
55
organization." These seem to be off the mark: Professor
Dunning
concludes that the lack was in a failure of legislative approval,
the
50 Id.

51 Id. at 282-85.
52 id. at 289.

58 Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 286.
55 Id. at 287.
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requisite funds, and the requisite push at the top levels of government. The failure at the national level to make significant progress
on land reform has also had an influence on other programs in which
the country's
land reform might play an important part, especially
56
project.
development
regional
most promising
Professor Dunning notes that land reform is related to naagricultional development in that modernization of the peasant 57
tural sector is necessary for national economic development. Such
transformation requires at least some implementation of land reform measures, though the last, if not strictly proven, rests on
highly plausible assumptions. Reform of the tenure system and
tenancy reform are probably economically beneficial. Insecurity
from lack of accurate land measurement and the prevalence of land
litigation are also assumed to be subject to alleviation by certain
policies, thus leading to greater modernization. Reform of the government land grant system may also have a bearing on peasant
modernization, but it is politically unrealistic to hope that land not
meeting development conditions could be reclaimed from present
holders, such as military officers. The extent of large landholdings
is unknown but relevant, and no economic case for redistribution
has yet been made, nor even seriously considered. Generally, the
Ethiopian leadership does not seem to have adopted, formally or
informally, any clear set of social or political objectives regarding
land toward which the nation can work, but rather limited isolated
58
steps to modify past patterns have been taken.
As one cause of this sluggishness, Professor Dunning suggests
that the government leadership simply misjudged its own effective
constituency of landowners, who apparently have reacted more
vigorously against the idea of even mild land reform measures than
was anticipated.5 9 Even mild land reform is a highly political act,
and in Ethiopia today serious political pressure for such reform
does not exist, especially not from peasant organizations or their
representatives. The past and present work of the Ministry of Land
Reform and Administration is useful to develop the knowledge of
field conditions and trained, perceptive administrative manpower
to plan, justify and implement measures of land reform; yet, all
this is only preliminary. The Ministry is not in a position to take
serious action on its own, as preference has been given to reforms
requiring legislation, much of which is unlikely to be enacted, rather
56 Id. at 287.
57 Id. at 293.
58 Id. at 304.

59 Id. at 306.
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than to other means of reform. Executive reforms, such as alteration of the government land grant system, are inhibited by substantial current or potential opposition within the executive itself.
Intensive domestic political pressure, in turn contingent on a
wider political evolutionary process not yet begun, must develop
for progress to be made. 0
The resemblance of the Ethiopian example in land reform at
the crossroads faced by law and legal institutions, to that in South
Africa is significant. In both cases executive action has substantially prevented the occurrence of a precondition (almost absolute
for South Africa, perhaps not quite so for Ethiopia) of long term
development for the masses of society. In South Africa the legislature has cooperated in this prevention as may well that of Ethiopia.
In both cases a pervasive controlling minority is using the existing
allocations of power, wealth and other kinds of influence to prevent
law, among other tools, from being used as an instrument of social
reform and development. In Austinian terms, however, the South
African government is relatively united for the moment on the
legal commands it gives relative to the status of black people
through both legislative and executive channels, whereas there is a
conflict and apparent confusion on land reform in Ethiopia. 61 In
both cases, there is a distinct temptation to assume that this fork
in the road may in fact be a trident, with the third alternative being
to abandon hope of any legal solutions to such profound problems,
leading those advising lawyers and others committed to legal process to counsel them to either await or to go out and organize the
needed revolution. Subsequently law would re-enter the picture as
the handmaiden of the expected new progressive public order.
The exhilaration of this tempting assumption is somewhat

dampened by the realization that such a glorious but desperate
remedy might be in fact recommended for a great many legal
problems equally profound, and that it is rarely certain that the
law and those committed to it, as a process of authoritative decision, have exhausted all of its remedies for a given problem until
solutions have, in fact, been prescribed by recognized law-givers
but found, after diligent effort, to be unrealizable. This is different
than foregoing the prescription of legal remedies altogether, although the temptation to do so in the South African context is
overwhelming. The question of when those committed to the law
as a tool of development and justice in good faith can give up in
favor of wholly justified but, in the domestic context, extra-legal
60 Id. at 307.
01 See Kuper & Kuper, supra note 2, at 15.
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measures is probably unanswerable by a sweeping rule. For our
purposes here, however, we shall stubbornly assume that the time
to do so, though probably close, has not yet arrived.

III. THE PARAMETERS OF THE CROSSROADS
to
In reflecting on the dilemma of the crossroads presented
these
by
suggested
law
lawmakers in certain areas of African
essays, all available predictive signposts must be located. One such
signpost is that this crossroads is not solely a crisis in the effectiveconness of statutory legislation per se, but also may encompass
policy
public
The
stitutional prohibitions and provisions as well.
should
of Liberia has been consistently that aliens (non-Africans)
its
within
be absolutely prevented from owning real property
ConLiberian
the
borders, as expressed in article V, section 12 of
stitution.6" Yet, despite this provision, aliens have been permitted
priand presently do enjoy significant interests in real property,
they
marily long-term leaseholds, that are pervasive even though
are called something other than "fee simple" estates. The constituits
tional prohibition as it is presently construed is ineffective for
control
and
of
use
the
have
fact
in
aliens
intended purpose, since
3
over large tracts of Liberian real estate." If their activities are
controlled at all, it is by means of government agencies enforcing
sophisticated regulatory provisions. What the prohibition has prevented are small purchases of land for residential and for small
4
business purposes.6 In this way the constitutional provision may be
a detriment to development, especially of the middle commercial
sector of the economy. Further, the existence of this crossroads
confronting an African government need not be strictly confined to
the present historical moment. The anti-alien policy is long-standing in Liberia, a country independent for over a century. Yet, the
ineffectiveness of the constitutional prohibition has evidently not
led to pertinent reform of the legal process to achieve the social
objective in actuality.
As previously defined, the two basic alternatives facing African governments are these: (1) To continue to attempt social and
political transformation by means of additional policy-responsive
legislation from the central government, at the risk of diminishing
returns in accomplishing social objectives; or (2) to develop new
relationships between "modern" central government-directed institutions and the national views of policy-makers, on the one hand,
62 1 LIBERIAN CODE 0or LAWS

3, 18 (1956).

See Parnall, Aliens and Real Property in Liberia, 12 J. AeR. L. 64 (1968).
" Id.

63
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and local institutions, customary law and practice, and the actual
perspectives of that part of the population that is (according to the
issue) the target of measures of social transformation on the
other. These, in other words, represent alternatives as to the application, invocation, appraisal and termination of legally-expressed
national policies. Both alternatives presuppose essentially consistent outcomes of recommendation and prescription of social policy
by means of legislation or other legal expression, i.e., that the
government has resolved its internal conflicts in general terms and
has decided upon the policy that should be followed except for
problems of implementation and enforcement.
As it is hoped that governments will move in the direction of
the second alternative, some possibilities for the necessary new
relationships between policy-makers and popular perspectives can
be suggested. These suggestions should not be taken as directives
to African governments to remedy deficiencies in the capacity of
their legal processes to effect social transformation, but rather as
an indication of the range of possible options-the choice of the
route out of the crossroads. Such options are by no means mutually
exclusive, and their availability singly or in combination will depend upon the particular policies and circumstances of each
government. The options, however, must all be considered in light
of the previously suggested efforts by the government to use the
most accurate possible techniques to ascertain the relevant attitudes among sectors of the population to be subjected to regulation
for development purposes.
One such option, for a new relationship between central legislative and local administrative or judicial institutions, lies in increased government education of the population at the local level
as to the aims, purposes, and strategies involved in building the
nation."5 Perhaps the outstanding example of this option in practice is the Arusha Declaration with the accompanying TANU
documents on the meaning of socialism for national development
issued in Tanzania." Essentially party declarations, both written
and inspired by President Nyerere, of ethics and goals lying somewhere between political exhortation and law, these documents are
designed to educate all the people of the country as to the purposes and programs of the government within a general philosophical framework and to clarify national goals in easily understood
terms. In doing so they aimed at, and evidently have created, a cer65 See GONMEC, supra note 6, at 146, 156.
66 The Arusha Declaration is reprinted in 3. NYE~m,

231-50 (1968).
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tain receptivity to legislation, executive orders, and the establishment
of local development institutions such as Ujamaa villages which
7
were subsequently instituted. A primary advantage of this form
of communication and education is the visible coherency of social
aims and strategies which give the population some idea of what to
expect in the future and why. Certain principles of the Arusha
Declaration have been incorporated into the Tanzanian Constitution, while the rest remain in the form of TANU documents widely
disseminated throughout the country." Similar government statements of an ideology of social, political and economic development
exist in Zambia with the principles of Humanism and in Uganda
6
with the Common Man's Charter.
As either a supplement or alternative to legislative regulation,
party statements in an African one-party state may well be a prime
factor in alleviating the tendencies towards alienation of the population from the government in times of stress brought on by rapid
social change. The authority of the government is strengthened,
seemingly, by the policies being set out at length and supported by
arguments and information, while the prestige of the government
is not directly called into question by making strict adherence to
those principles a matter of law to which violation the State must
react. Coherent explanatory party statements may serve a similar
function outside of the context of a coherent social ideology. Such
was the case in Malawi in 1967 when the government decided to ban
mini-skirts. The communication of this ban was by means of a
Party Directive signed by the President as Life Chairman of the
Malawi Congress Party, with an explanatory statement, posted
prominently in public places, warning that commercial establishments which did not ban mini-skirted women from entering would
be closed under the President's standing legislative authority to do
so "in the public interest," and that European women who did so
would be subject to deportation under the President's standing
powers to make such an unappealable decision under the Immigration Act." The Party machinery throughout the country, especially
the women's groups, declared their full support to the President
67 Cf. id. at 249-50, 385-409; Rahim, Legislative Implementation of the Arusha
Declaration,4 E. Asa. L.J. 183 (1968); Tordoff, Provincial & District Government in
Zambia, 7 J. ADuIm. OVRSEAS 538, 545 (1968). But for difficulties in this process
and resistance to implementation, see Sawyerr, Discriminatory Restrictions on Private
Dispositions of Land in Tanganyika: A Second Look, 13 J. AYR. L. 2, 23-27.
68 Rahim, supra note 67, at 183.
69 See K. KAUNDA, HuMANisM iN ZAmBIA AND GuIDE TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION
(1969). For an accurate summary of the Common Man's Charter, see 6 Am. RaSEnCH BuLL. 1481-83 (1969).
70 3 LAws OF MALAwI, ch. 15:03 (5)(1)(a)-(5)(4) (1968).
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in his determination to eliminate the wearing of such clothing.

The police, however, were in an ambiguous position, since one
does
not feel comfortable ignoring a party directive in a one-party
state
and yet police powers did not include statutory authorization
to
enforce the mini-skirt ban. A few arrests were made on vagrancy
charges, but generally police contented themselves with
taking
names and addresses of offenders. The point is that this method
of
regulation was highly effective, though its substantive content
may
be debated, especially by men.
Social regulation by party statements and directives in
a
one-party state where, in contrast to the Eastern European
or
Chinese experience, the party is generally expected to play
far less
than an absolutely controlling role, would seem to suggest an
original African contribution to producing a new jurisprudence
based
on alternative methods of communication between government
and
people for the greater understanding of both.71
In connection with the above, a second option presented is the
wide dissemination of brochures, manuals and guidebooks clearly
explaining to the people the purposes behind key development
legislation. In other words, the drafting of complementary documents
for a lay public as a needed adjunct to legislation. This technique
is already in operation in Eastern Europe, and analogous "books
of
authority" have been used in England and "coutumiers" in Europe
in the period preceding codification. 72
A third option is for the country's High Court to assume an
active guiding role towards the judiciary by issuing interpretations,
advisory opinions, and en banc memoranda which seek to harmonize judicial and executive policy. In other words, the High
Court
would act as more or less the authoritative intermediary between
the courts and the government, interpreting the relationships
between the broad social policies of the country and the law.
This
judicial leadership role is currently being played in Eastern
European countries, and variants have been suggested for the
African
context to ensure that courts are responsive to national social
policy
71 The Church in Catholic countries has often
played a similar though more
rigid role in defining "public morals." But despite its new liberalism
in some countries, notably in Latin America, the similarity is tenuous. Its
historic extranational
ties to Rome, the growing uneasiness over its frequently pervasive
behind-the-scenes
influence on government policy while lacking public accountability,
its uncertain
commitment to national development, its frequent control
property and alliance with defenders of the status quo, and of large amounts of
the ongoing Western
political tradition of separation between church and state would
seem to weaken
any historical analogies to the party in African one-party states.
72 David, supra note 10, at 10.
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but within the rule of law. The court would not be blindly legitimating executive policies but, to the extent that those policies come
to be expressed in authoritative communications, would seek to
convey their full implications to inferior courts and to anticipate
possible legal questions involved in maintaining judicial interpretation as a process relevant to national development.

In Eastern Europe, subsequent to the adoption of various legal
codes, court practice is seen as developing law to breathe life into
74
the code by interpretation and analogy. Supreme courts have the
task of analyzing court practice throughout the country by a
variety of techniques: advisory opinions (non-binding on lower
courts), decisions on principal matters (binding), and directives of
7
a politico-legal nature (binding) . The conflict between the twin
social needs for stability and change is thus resolved. Such analysis
by the high court could and should be done in close consultation6
with law faculties and legal research centers within the country.
But as Mr. Justice P.T. Georges of Tanzania points out, in contrast
to Marxist doctrines animating a communist state, TANU doctrine
does not seek to embrace and direct the whole range of human
activity. 77 Therefore the scope of such advisory opinions that would
be handed down by a high court in an African socialist state would
almost certainly be less comprehensive. The courts generally must
take the lead in making themselves more sensitive to national
development policy in order that:
[A] public opinion will gradually be created, permeating throughout
the party that the courts must be preserved because of the indispensable role which they play. The leaders at the top realise it and
often stress it. But the task demands more than the occasional pronouncement. For these reasons I see no harm and much good in party
membership by members of the judiciary and the use of opportunities
which membership offers to show a positive interest in helping the
process of rapid national development and to78 stress the importance
of the courts in the achievement of that goal.
A fourth option consists of an increased frequency of deliberate government decisions to withhold legislative or executive
action affecting public behavior in favor of an expanded effort to
ascertain the relevant trends of belief and behavior in the society,
and then, if possible, to rest future government action on the play73 Eorsi, supra note 19, at 274-76.
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Georges, The Court in the Tanzania One-Party State, in
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Id. at 45.
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ing out of these trends and not on their manipulation by legislative
enactment. This would seem especially applicable to criminal law
situations. For instance, elopement in Uganda was disappearing as
a social activity until, by making it a criminal offense in the Penal
Code, it was revived to the accompaniment of manifestly increased
conflicts and tensions. The situation was not aided by the apparent
inaccuracy of the transcription of the offense from customary law
into legislation and by the difficulty of distinguishing this offense
in the Code from that of adultery. 9 In this connection, remnants of
the repugnancy doctrine held over from colonial times in the legal
systems of independent African states (where customary law is
judged by constitutional law and legislation from the central government, instead of by received colonial law) and other internal
conflicts rules must be reexamined to see whether their applications
are useful or detrimental in the development process."0 Also, reconsideration might be given to the expanding, and possibly over used,
governmental practice of attempting to deter each violation of
development related public regulatory statutes by attaching severe
penalties usually reserved for strictly criminal offenses.
A consideration of the range of options available to governments which choose the second fork out of the crossroads raises
the question of the characteristics of the body of law that will hopefully emerge in each country as a useful tool for its development. This question has often been posed in terms of legal integration: Will the country succeed in evolving a single unified legal
system applicable to everyone, and if so, what will be its key features? This question has been referred to more generally by
Professor Ren6 David, inquiring whether a national "common law"
of African states will evolve along the lines of a "modern jus
gentium."'' He concluded that such an evolution may well occur,
similar to the development of Roman law, under the informed influence of national governments which would have to take account
of current customary law and practices, modernize them, and thus
create a new synthesis.8" It is unnecessary here to set out all the
79 Obol-Ochola, supra note 19. In this connection Professor David has strongly
recommended that African legislatures voluntarily and consciously ignore activities
in certain institutions and areas of life where conflicts are worked out by formal
or informal means. See David, supra note 10. This strongly implies a propensity to
retain, not supersede, customary institutions. A related suggestion has been made
to give local courts generally broader powers of conciliation and arbitration and
even powers to decide disputes ex aequo et bono under broad legislative policies.
See Eorsi, supra note 19, at 280.
80 See Sawyerr, Internal Conflict of Laws in East Africa, in EAST A,'ascAN LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 22, at 110, 134-38.
81 David, supra note 10, at 5.
82 Id. Perhaps the most useful discussion of national unification of laws in
Africa is found in Allott, supra note 5, at 61.
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considerations involved in modernizing customary law; some of
these have been previously noted,83 and much of the resolution of
such problems depends upon the conditions and imperatives in each
country. However, it is relevant to peer down this path from the
crossroads to see whether the adoption by African governments of
the second alternative to meet their dilemma in law may necessarily
lead to the evolution of some kind of "common law."
In asking whether such a new common law will emerge in
African nations, we must ask by what modalities and agencies it
will emerge. Law is a process of authoritative decision by constitutive and public order decision-makers, and a new common law
presupposes its arrival as an outcome of this process. Its arrival
will be produced, if at all, by certain highly articulated strategies
on the part of decision-makers who act on the basis of their own
attitudes and perspectives to meet various objectives established
by the government or otherwise arising out of the legal process or
the values held by the people of the country. These strategies will
be carried out using value-resources, such as power, wealth, respect
and rectitude, within the context and procedures of various arenas.
To establish the plausibility of the evolution of a new common law
in African states, these factors must be briefly considered relative
to background conditions there.
The common law in England emerged when the King's courts,
in order to establish their independence of Parliament, undertook
to interpret legislative enactments according to their own precedents and derived principles. Ius gentium emerged when the law
applicable to relationships between people from different nonRoman communities in the Roman empire replaced the traditional
4
Roman jus civile because it was more effective as legislation. One
condition in both instances for such an evolution was a consistent
general philosophy and vantage point from which to interpret disputes and resolve questions of law as they arose. In other words, a
body of perspectives shared by decision-makers in a form coherent
enough to produce successive decisions over time, having a principled relationship to each other, was necessary. This precondition of
arena, perspectives, and strategies was furnished in England by a
strong local judiciary, whose judges were conscious of their role in
developing a body of law, which they did in part by gradually
5
eliminating a body of local custom as undesirable.1 Do such conditions exist in Africa?
83 See note 20 supra.
84 Id. David, supra note 10, at 5.
85 Id.
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Able and trained local judges are still in very short supply.
When competent judges do emerge on the local level, they are
often transferred to the capital to work for the central government or promoted to a high appeals bench. Generally speaking,
there are a slowly increasing number of capable magistrates
filtering into judicial systems from overseas and local law schools,
but their presence is not uniform throughout Africa nor throughout any one country, with the exception of Nigeria and two or
three other countries with pre-independence traditions of Africans
training for the bar. This difficulty is complemented by the lack of
a strong national bar or, as is generally true in Southern Africa,
expatriate domination of the bar. 86
The lack of a capable cadre of local magistrates and a strong
bar raises doubts about the emergence of the necessary body of
coherent principles and perspectives to be applied by the local
judiciary. There is currently a serious problem in the relationship
between precedent and the application of principles to disputes to
produce over time a coherent body of judge-made law. First, most
precedents, especially in areas of commercial law vital to the private enterprise sector, date back to the received colonial law in the
form of antiquated statutes and decisions dictated by an arbitrary
cut-off date. Customary law is generally limited in resolving many
questions arising, and that will increasingly arise, out of the monetary sector of the economy, such as those concerning contracts for
the sale and delivery of large quantities of goods on a commercial
basis, though in many cases it continues to be invoked and locally
preferred for small transactions between individuals. Enough time
has not passed for an adequate body of local written precedent to
emerge as available to local courts to apply to these and other
kinds of disputes before them.87 Moreover, oral precedent seems to
be of limited nation-wide utility, relinquishing in repeatable precision over the long term that which it gains in flexibility over the
short term. And even if sufficient time has elapsed, we have noted
that the basic legal policy of the relationship between local customary law, received law and central government statutes has not yet
been decided or clarified in most African states. The situation in this
respect is one of ferment, and the judiciary does not have the
86 See generally Allott, Judicial Precedent in Africa Revisited, 12 J. AR. L. 3,
3-4 (1968); Carey, The Law Society Seminar: A Forward Look, 1 E. AFR. L. REv.
102 (1968); Hodgin, Proposed Changes in Legal Education in Uganda, 6 E. Am. L.J.
152 (1970) ; Scotton, Judicial Independence and Political Expression in East AfricaTwo Colonial Legacies, 6 E. AiR. L.J. 1 (1970); Twining, Social Justice and the Law,

in
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87 See Seidman, supra note 1, at 32-33.

supra note 22, at 278.
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strength to act alone through its own decisions to resolve the
dilemma by defining that relationship. Thus, without such a clarification of legal objectives, shared by the judiciary relative to that
relationship, the vital consistent general philosophy and vantage
point needed as a basis from which to interpret questions of law
to provide principled precedent for similar questions would seem to
be lacking. Likewise, if such a philosophy is agreed but the people
continue to refer most of their disputes for resolution to alternative
legal institutions that do not act under the same principles, the
emergence of a new common law would seem thwarted by the
refusal of the population to recognize as authoritative such decision-makers, philosophy and principles of dispute-resolution. This
is the situation with the Atbia Dagnia in Ethiopia, where those
local courts, though sharing a general philosophy and vantage
point, are no more than institutionalized legalisms.
An additional consideration relating to strategies, objectives,
arenas, and decision-makers and their perspectives, is that for
several classes of local disputes on which authoritative decisions
must be made, many African states are not committed to resolving
them within a precedent-producing judicial framework. Rather,
resolution is to be sought within an administrative context where
the decision-maker is deliberately given wide discretion to solve
problems and implement broad policies while being only lightly
restricted by specific principles, past decisions, or the requirement
to coherently justify in writing the reasons for his action. In this
setting judicial review would tend to be limited to questions of
fairness and to have increasingly restricted opportunities to reverse
such a decision on substantive grounds. The comparative ineffectiveness of judicial review may well be due, in English-speaking
African countries, to the adoption of a system of administrative law
developed in a country without a written constitution that includes
no requirement that administrative officers give reasons for their
decisions, and that rests on a strong tradition of rectitude in public
life. 8
The growth of such an administrative apparatus seems to be
an inevitable concomitant of any land reform program, as illus9
trated by the experiences of Kenya and Tanganyika, and by the
still feeble tendencies in Ethiopia. Since most African states have
already or must in the future confront the question of whether
current patterns of land usage, tenure and tenancy are adequate
88 Id. at 66-68.
89 McAuslan, Control of Land and Agricultural Development, in Kenya and
Tanzania, in EAST AnucAN LAw AN SociAL CHAwGE, supra note 22, at 180.
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for rapid national development and since questions concerning
rights in land touch the local peasant and the majority of the
population most intimately, the removal of this category of disputes
from judicial consideration, as the state assumes a greater degree
of control over the land, would seem to be a major blow to the
emergence of a new common law. Further, there is some indication
of local distrust in some countries of lawyers' intrusion into land
questions." ° These questions have traditionally been regarded as
economic or political problems, to be resolved as such, with the
result that resistance occurs to the introduction of law as a basis
of decision. 91 Additionally, land in Africa has, with few exceptions
in "white-settler" areas, traditionally never been a saleable commodity, but rather conceived of as belonging to all and generally
available to those who need it and would use it.92 Rights of alienation and allocation accordingly vested generally in a central
authority figure for the common good of the clan or tribe. This
tradition is generally being perpetuated by African governments in
vesting title by statute in the Head of State for the benefit of the
people, precisely in order to retain state control over its occupancy,
usage, consolidation and disposition, as opposed to allowing these
factors to be controlled by market forces.93 Such a sustained attempt to remove land from the commercial sector by means of
administrative institutions denies a capable judiciary of an opportunity to develop a body of property law-perhaps the heart of the
English common law-and indicates that needed authoritative decisions in key areas of national life are currently felt to be more
responsive to the development needs of the state in statutory and
administrative contexts.
The foregoing is stated not to argue that a common law or a
jus gentium will never emerge in most African countries, but to

argue that under present conditions there are substantial obstacles
to such an evolution. However, the adoption by a given African

government of all or some of the options previously discussed as
comprising the alternative to over-reliance on legislation as a
source of law could well improve conditions for the future evolution
of some kind of flexible body of precedent-based national law. The
adoption of intermediate methods of authoritative communication,
symbolized by the Arusha Declaration, in conjunction with the superior courts adopting an active coordinating role, may in time
90 Td. at 202.
91 Id.
92 See VERHELST, supra note 20, at 27. Cf. Mayer & Mayer, Land Law in the
Making, in AFucAN LAW: ADOPTION AN DEVELOPMENT 51, 59 (1965).
93 VzRmEL8T, supra note 20, at 26-27.
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produce the necessary philosophy of law in society and the coherent
body of principles necessary to establish precedents commanding
the respect of judicial or legislative law-makers. Increasing opportunities in each country for legal education, promoted by most if
not all African governments, currently aim to produce larger numbers of magistrates; and, this could well produce in time a judicial
system competent down to the local level to derive legal principles
from the resolution of similar questions. In the future, an equilibrium will hopefully be reached in each country as to the role of
customary, received and legislative law that will produce a foundation on which further legal development can be based. 4 Presently,
the English-speaking African countries have and acknowledge the
received tradition of the English common law. Although its substantive and procedural doctrines are currently being severely questioned, that tradition provides a ready source of judicial strategies
possibly applicable to the evolution of case-derived judicial precedent in each country. In any case, flat predictions about the future
of law in Africa are outrageously dangerous, and none are attempted here.
The essays on Ethiopian land reform and the right to counsel
in South Africa, while setting out elements of the same general
legal dilemma, indicate further that on the way to that particular
crossroads the bridge of coherent prescription must be crossed.
94 T. 0. Elias has argued that the judiciary is the most enduring part of the
British heritage in English-speaking Africa, in that minimum innovation has been
introduced since independence, and has noted specifically: "While the pattern of the
West Coast has been the establishment of an integrated system between the customary
courts and the British-established courts so that a system of appeals runs to the
highest court, the East and Central African pattern has generally been one of parallel
developments between the local or customary courts and the British-established ones,
although integration has been carried far in recent years even in these areas. An
integrated system has the virtue of promoting the gradual evolution of a common
law for each territory." Elias, The Commonwealth in Africa, 31 MODERN L. REV.
284, 300-01 (1968). Further, an independent judiciary in the British sense remains
a live ideal in the majority of these African states. Id. at 301.
It would seem that the success of judicial integration in promoting the evolution
of a common law for each African state rests heavily on the sensitivities of the high
court judges to what is or is not customary law in the area from which the case
originates. If the members of the high bench in fact lack an accurate au courant
knowledge of the customary legal expectations relative to the issues before them,
even if these expectations must be modified in the ensuing decision, there is a great
risk of the attempts to enforce the court judgments actually increasing the lack of
respect for law generally, already noted as a serious problem in development-related
areas, by being (1) basically incomprehensible while triggering demands upon the
people by the State's administrative machinery and (2) irrelevant to the heritage of
the citizens of that region or hostile to their interests (though perhaps of short-term
benefit to a prevailing litigant), and therefore locally perceived as unjust. The
success of judicial integration, in other words, would seem to largely depend on the
fruition of many of the other prerequisites for the evolution of a common law discussed above.
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That bridge is constructed of authoritative remedies prescribed to
identify and meet head-on certain basic questions which are survival issues in that particular society. In Africa many of these
issues relate directly to the maintenance of national unity. Continuing the metaphor, if that bridge is washed out or otherwise
blocked, then it must be established that legal process can supply
the materials, or at least be included in the building specifications,
to cross the channel to arrive at the originally identified crossroads
of effective implementation. It must be established that the existing
legal system of Ethiopia has some relevance to the problem of
circumventing the entrenched conservatism of Ethiopian landowners and military officers so that coherent land reform policies
can be prescribed, a prospect that Professor Dunning concludes is
unlikely. It must be established that the existing legal system dominated by white South Africa has some relevance, minimally through
the judiciary's enforcement of an existing and perhaps expanded
right to counsel vis-h-vis politically motivated pernicious internal
security legislation, to the basic problems of financial and apartheid
factors militating against black South Africans receiving counsel in
the great majority of prosecutions, and ultimately to the even more
basic problem of producing equality for black South Africans in all
areas of life. This prospect is even more unlikely at the present given
current trends in South Africa. 5 These are usually thought of as
"political" problems, and indeed they are. But they are no less
"legal" problems, if for no other reason than that law-makers committed to basic concepts of equality and national development, once
they have identified the sources of these dilemmas, must wrestle with
the fundamental question of what to do with their time and effort
as people committed to the resolution of social problems by systematic, public, consistent and reasonably just authoritative principles
and procedures. To paraphrase the old legal maxim, they may not
forget as lawyers and law-makers what they know as African men.
Whether they should even temporarily abdicate their legal role
when faced with profound identifiable social conflicts is as much a
legal as a political question. Our hope here is that abdication as
such will not occur, though commitment to legal process in general
in their minds or in the public mind may be weakened or submerged for periods of time by overwhelming political forces.
The importance of the essays in this symposium for governments and others concerned with effective legal process in Africa
seems clear. The majority of black-ruled African states, on issues
95 The profound extent of this unlikelihood is cogently demonstrated in L.
MmtQUARD, THE PEOPLES AND PO.CIES Or SOUTH ArRicA 117-26 (4th ed. 1969).
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analogous to overurbanization and legal integration relative to
competing customary laws and practices, are evolving their own set
of social goals, but with a substantial degree of implementation and
enforcement difficulties, and thus face the crossroads discussed
here. Tanzania might be the country with the most coherent policy
objectives and the most complete public dialog as a basis for striking out down the second road, in terms of new directions in effective
lawmaking. However, many of the same countries that have defined
goals and policies on the above or other imperative issues of domestic law, stand before the bridge of coherent prescription relative
to certain fundamental questions, such as land reform and the status of black people in an apartheid state, which in many cases is in
sad disrepair or washed out altogether. Such bridges must be constructed from effective policies prescribed by those of popularly
recognized authority, in fulfillment of generally accepted popular
goals. The building of these bridges is stymied, in states where such
bridges must be built before sustained mass development can
occur, by combinations of vested interests, such as entrenched
landowners allied with the military, in conjunction with the obstacles of underdevelopment, notably illiteracy. In such situations the
government often finds itself whipsawed between the recognized
grave need for reform and its inability under its own procedures to
even agree on a policy for reform. Alternatively, the government,
whose base of power is composed of political forces entrenched in
the status quo and which coloration it willingly adopts, may be even
more elitist than usual. South Africa and Ethiopia stand, respectively, as extreme and recalcitrant examples of vested interests
utilizing power and the concomitants of underdevelopment to wash
out the bridge. And while politically and historically they, along
with the still-existing colonial territories, may be African anachronisms, their dilemmas of legal process and legal development contain
valuable lessons for the rest of Africa.
The essays in this symposium well illustrate the bridge that
must be crossed and locate the crossroads beyond that bridge
where the correct choices must be made by African governments in
order for their legal processes to play a constructive role in national
development.

